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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Wagner appeals, contending that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his petition for post conviction relief in the face of at least one genuine 
issue of material fact. Specifically, he claims that defense counsel in his underlying 
criminal case was ineffective for not responding to the State's motion to have of two of 
Mr. Wagner's prior convictions declared admissible under I.RE. 404(b) and for coercing 
his guilty plea by promising he would receive a life sentence if he did not plead guilty. 
He alleged that he would not have pied guilty but fOi trial counsel's deficient 
performance in these regards. 
The State responds, primarily contending that Mr. Wagner's assertions of fact in 
his affidavits were not sufficient to create genuine issues of material fact. Its analysis in 
that regard is directly contrary to precedent in that, at the summary disposition phase of 
post conviction proceedings, the facts, including those alleged in Mr. Wagner's own 
affidavits, are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner. The State's 
arguments also focus too narrowly on specific facts, ignoring other relevant facts in the 
record that disprove the State's arguments. Therefore, the State's arguments are 
meritless and should be rejected. 
As a result, this Court should reverse the order summarily dismissing the petition, 
vacate the judgment in this case, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedin s 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Wagner's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition for post 
conviction relief even though he presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue 
of material fact. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred B Summaril Dismissin Mr. Wa ner's Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief Even Though He Presented Evidence Sufficient To Raise A Genuine 
Issue Of Material Fact 
A. Mr. Wagner's Claim That His Trial Attorney Was Ineffective For Not Challenging 
The Admissibility Of His Prior Record At Trial Was Not Waived By Post 
Conviction Counsel 
The State contends that this Court cannot consider Mr. Wagner's claim - that his 
attorney was ineffective for not fighting against the State's request to present the facts 
underlying two prior convictions at trial - because post conviction counsel purpotiedly 
waived the claim below. (Resp. Br., pp.10-11.) That assertion by the State fails to 
appreciate the entire argument that post conviction counsel made below. Post 
conviction counsel was explaining that there were several different ways that the claim, 
as articulated in Mr. Wagner's pro se petition, could be interpreted. As such, post 
conviction counsel was directing the district court to the proper interpretation of the 
claim Mr. Wagner wanted to pursue and conceding the alternate interpretations did not 
constitute bases for relief. Post conviction counsel did not concede the argument that 
Mr. Wagner intended to pursue. In fact, he reiterated the request for an evidentiary 
hearing on that claim in his brief and at the summary disposition hearing. 1 (R., p.57; 
Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.15-20.) 
In his memorandum in support of Mr. Wagner's claims, post conviction counsel 
noted that "Petitioner's pleading [on this issue] is confusing." (R., p.56.) In his pro se 
petition, Mr. Wagner claimed, "Counsel did not fight to keep 13 [year] old evidence out 
1 The fact that post conviction counsel continued to request an evidentiary hearing on 
this claim affirmatively demonstrates that he was not conceding the issue. 
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of court. . . . Counsel failed to argue to keep prior record out of court records." 
(R., pp.5-6.) In the affidavit accompanying the pro se petition, he added, "My 
attorney ... did not argue to keep a 13 year old felony conviction from being used 
against me. Further he allowed the prosecuting attorney to rely solely upon my criminal 
record for a conviction rather than any evidence in the present case." (R., p.9.) 
He clarified in a subsequent affidavit, "2. My Trial Counsel told me my prior record 
would cause me to lose at jury trial. 3. I only plead [sic] guilty because Trial Counsel 
told me I would lose at jury trial. ... 6. I would have asked the case be tried to a jury, 
but Trial Counsel advised me I would lose because of my prior record." (R., pp.73-74.) 
Because the thrust of Mr. Wagner's claim was unclear, post conviction counsel sought 
to clarify the claim. 
To that end, post conviction counsel explained that the claim Mr. Wagner 
intended to pursue was that he "was led to believe his history would be admitted at trial, 
the jury would convict him because of his [criminal] history, and he would suffer a far 
worse fate than what was contemplated by the plea agreement. The Petitioner pied this 
in his petition as: Trial Counsel having failed to keep the information 'out' as he should 
have." (R., p.56.) Post conviction counsel maintained, "Petitioner asks this court to 
deny the State's request to dismiss and allow the matter to go to evidentiary hearing." 
(R., pp.56-57.) 
Post conviction counsel provided an additional explanation of his clarification of 
the issue at the summary dismissal hearing: 
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With regard to the prior history -- the prior history from the state of 
New York,[2] I explained to my client that it probably wouldn't come in 
in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached 
to be a common scheme or plan. 
I certainly conceded in my memorandum that the Court absolutely 
would consider that type of information at sentencing. It's absolutely 
appropriate for the court to consider at sentencing. And I'm certain that 
[the prosecutor] would have and did both highlight his criminal history as 
an aggravating feature at sentencing in this particular case. 
But I think the way I explained it in terms of interpreting the pro se 
petition that's been filed before Your Honor was that [trial counsel] said 
that you [Mr. Wagner] would be facing a much worse outcome and that 
you can't take the case to trial because of your prior history. And I think 
what my client heard was: I won't [take] the case to trial, and you need to 
plead guilty and accept this offer. 
At least that's the way he has explained it to me. I realize that, in 
and of itself isn't grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel. But that's 
certainly the way Mr. Wagner would want anyone reading his affidavit and 
petition to appreciate the nature of the allegation that he's making. 
I also brought up the issue of voluntariness, intelligence, and 
knowing making a plea. I think 1\/lr. Wagner believes he was duped into 
pleading guilty, and he would want this Court to deny the State's request 
to dismiss and allow him to proceed to an evidentiary hearing. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.20.) As such, post conviction counsel framed the argument 
IVlr. Wagner was pursuing as an allegation that the prior history would not have been 
admissible at trial and trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that point. (R., p.56.) 
Post conviction counsel also argued that there was a basis for trial counsel to have 
made that argument: "I explained to my client that [the prior record] probably wouldn't 
come in in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached to be 
a common scheme or plan." (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.16-19.) On that claim, post conviction 
counsel maintained that Mr. Wagner should receive an evidentiary hearing. (R., p.57; 
Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.15-20.) 
2 Only one of the prior convictions was from New York; the second was from Virginia. 
( See, e.g., R., pp.65-66.) 
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Looking at post conviction counsel's entire argument, it becomes clear that post 
conviction counsel's concessions only relate to potential interpretations of the claim 
that Mr. Wagner was not pursuing. For example, post conviction counsel explained that 
Mr. Wagner was not arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not keeping the prior 
convictions out of the sentencing proceedings. (R., p.56; Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.20-23.) 
Therefore, he "conceded" the prior convictions were appropriately considered during the 
sentencing phase of the proceedings. (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.20-22.) Similarly, post 
conviction counsel explained that Mr. Wagner was not arguing that trial counsel forced 
him to plead guilty by saying that he would not try the case, since post conviction 
counsel believed that such a claim would not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel.3 (Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.2-1 ·1.) 
On appeal, Mr. Wagner continues to pursue the issue post conviction counsel 
raised: his trial attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable because trial 
counsel did not fight to keep Mr. Wagner's criminal record from being declared 
admissible at trial, even though Idaho Supreme Court precedent on point reveals that 
3 Post conviction counsel was mistaken in that assertion. The defendant has the right to 
decide whether or not to take a case to trial. See, e.g., State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 
965-66 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that trial counsel cannot waive the right to a trial, the 
defendant must do that personally). Certainly, counsel may offer advice in that regard, 
but ultimately, the decision belongs to the defendant. See id. Therefore, trial counsel's 
refusal to try to the case despite the defendant's wishes would constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. However, as the State points out, post conviction counsel 
conceded that particular argument - that counsel forced him to plead guilty by saying he 
would not try the case. Therefore, were Mr. Wagner attempting to pursue that particular 
claim on appeal, the State's argument would be well taken. But since Mr. Wagner is not 
pursuing that particular claim, the State's argument - that this Court cannot consider the 
merits of Mr. Wagner's claim because post conviction counsel conceded the point - is 
mistaken. 
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he would have been successful. Since that argument was never waived, it is properly 
raised on appeal. As such, this Court should consider the rnerits of that claim. 
B. Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Counsel 
Was Ineffective For Not Challenging The Admissibility Of His Prior Record At 
Trial 
On the merits of Mr. Wagner's claim - that trial counsel was ineffective by not 
fighting to keep his prior record from being declared admissible at trial ~ the State 
contends that the two prior convictions at issue would have been found relevant under 
1.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan. (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.) The 
State's arguments are erroneous on several levels. 
First, they are internally inconsistent. As the State points out, Mr. Wagner's prior 
convictions dealt with acts that "appeared to be an almost impulsive manner." (Resp. 
Br., p. ·12; see also Resp. Br., p.12 (referring to "[Mr.] Wagner's previous conviction for 
impulsively molesting [a child]").) When a person acts impulsively, they are acting on 
"[a] sudden urge or inclination that prompts an unplanned action." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY, 344 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) (emphasis added). Thus, impulsive actions are, 
by definition, not part of some preconceived plan or scheme. See id. Therefore, the 
State's contention that these impulsive prior acts would somehow be relevant under 
I.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan is palpably absurd and should 
be rejected as such. 
Second, applying the rule set forth, and consistently reaffirmed, by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in regard to prior bad acts potentially relevant as evidence of a common 
scheme or plan, it is clear that Mr. Wagner's prior convictions were irrelevant to any 
purpose but propensity. The State contends that, because there are similar features 
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between those past actions and the act Mr. Wagner was alleged to have committed in 
this case, the prior acts were relevant beyond mere propensity. (Resp. Br., p.12.) 
However, that analysis does not incorporate the entirety of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
rule. The prior acts must be "so related to each other that proof of one tends to 
establish the other." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9 (2013) (emphasis from original); 
Statev. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54-55 (2009); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 750-51 
(1991 ), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )). This 
means that there must be '"evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare 
fact that' the defendant has committed the same kind of misconduct in the past." 
Joy, 155 Idaho at 9 (quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 (2010)) (emphasis 
added). The Supreme Court has explained, "In other words, at a minimum, there must 
be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct 
has occurred with children in the past." Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. Thus, the Idaho 
Supreme Court held in Johnson, for example, that the fact that the victims were similar 
in age, the defendant had a similar relationship to the victims, and the touching was 
similar in nature was not sufficient to establish that the evidence was relevant to some 
non-propensity purpose. Id. at 669. 
However, that is all the State argues in this case - that Mr. Wagner committed 
the same kind of act by touching children of a similar age in a similar way with a similar 
(i.e., non-existent) relationship to them and that makes the prior bad act evidence 
relevant for a non-propensity purpose.4 (Resp. Br., p.12.) As that argument is 
4 The State's argument is particularly inappropriate in this case, where the prior conduct 
occurred across the country fourteen years ago. (See, e.g., R., pp.65-66; Supp. 
R., pp.57-58.) The significant temporal and spacial separation between the prior 
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expressly foreclosed by Idaho Supreme Court precedent, it does not demonstrate that 
the district court's decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's claim was appropriate. 
Therefore, considering the argument Mr. Wagner has pursued on appeal, based 
on the facts in the record considered in the light most favorable to him, there is, at least, 
a genuine issue of fact as to trial counsel's ineffectiveness for not pursuing a legitimate 
argument against the admission of his prior convictions. If resolved in his favor, 
Mr. Wagner would be entitled to relief on that claim. As such, the district court erred 
when it summarily dismissed his petition. 
Furthermore, the State does not respond to the fact that the district court did not 
resolve the issue presented by Mr. Wagner, but instead, focused on the admissibility of 
the prior record evidence during the sentencing phase of the case. ( See App. 
Br., pp.8-9; see generally Resp. Br.) The fact that the district court's ruling was 
inapposite to the argument Mr. Wagner was making demonstrates that, whatever else 
this Court might determine on the merits of this issue, the district court's decision to 
summarily dismiss the petition, which was based on an irrelevant analysis, was in error 
and should be reversed. 
C. Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Attorney 
Gave Erroneous Assertion Regarding The Sentence He Would Receive If He Did 
Not Plead Guilty 
Mr. Wagner also claims his trial attorney was ineffective because he coerced 
Mr. Wagner to plead guilty by telling him he "would be" sentenced to a life term if he 
went to trial. (App. Br., pp.9-10.) The State contends that Mr. Wagner made only a 
conduct and the alleged conduct in this case demonstrates that, despite the generic 
similarities between the acts, the prior acts are not so related to the alleged conduct that 
they are relevant to anything other than mere propensity. 
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bare conclusion, unsupported by facts. (Resp. Br., pp.12-14.) The State's argument is 
rneritless, as it acknowledges Mr. Wagner made the following assertion of fact in his 
own affidavit: '"Trial counsel told me I would be sentenced to life in prison if I lost at 
trial."' (Resp. Br., p.13 (quoting R, p.73).) As that statement constitutes an assertion of 
fact within Mr. Wagner's personal knowledge, it constitutes evidence which the district 
court was required to consider in its summary dismissal calculus. See, e.g., 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2007). In Baldwin, the Idaho Supreme Court 
explained, "Baldwin presents his own affidavit describing his version of the interaction 
[in question]. Baldwin's affidavit sets forth facts that would be admissible at trial. Thus, 
because Baldwin's Petition and Affidavit present facts that would entitle Baldw1n to 
relief, if he were able to prove them at a hearing, the district court erred when it 
surnmariiy dismissed the petition." Id. (emphasis added). Like the petitioner in Baldwin, 
Mr. Wagner alleged facts in his own affidavit that demonstrated his attorney performed 
deficiently. Thus, Mr. Wagner presented sufficient evidence to survive summary 
judgment. 
Nevertheless, the State contends that, because a life sentence was one potential 
sentence that might have been imposed, "trial counsel was right to be concerned about 
the possibility of a life sentence," and therefore, his advice was not objectively 
unreasonable. (Resp. Br., pp.13-14 (emphasis added).) However, the State's 
argument in that regard does not demonstrate that summary dismissal of this case was 
appropriate. All the State's argument does is highlight the genuine issue of material fact 
that existed on this issue - what did trial counsel tell Mr. Wagner? The two possibilities 
11 
are 1) that he told tvlr. Wanger that a life sentence would be imposed, and 2) that he told 
Mr. Wagner that a life sentence might be imposed. 
At the summary dismissal stage, the district court is required to construe the facts 
in the light most favorable to the defendant. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793 
(2004) (quoting Saykahmchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995)). Applying that rule 
in this case means that, at the summary dismissal stage, the district court was required 
to consider the claim as though Mr. Wagner was correct, and trial counsel told him that 
he would be sentenced to a life term. That phrasing - "would be" - indicates that the 
life term was more than a mere possibility, but rather, was definitely the sentence that 
would have been imposed if he did not plead guilty. Thus, by telling Mr. Wagner he 
"would be" sentenced to a life term if he did not plead guilty, trial counsel was promising 
a particular sentence would result from Mr. Wagner's choice on the plea agreement. 
When a promise that a particular sentence will result and that promise induces 
the defendant to plead guilty, the defendant is entitled to relief. See Puckett v. United 
States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 
(1962); State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253,256 (2012) (adopting the rationale from Puckett 
and applying it to plea agreements and promises made therein). Thus, as in Baldwin, 
Mr. Wagner's affidavit created, at least, a genuine issue of material fact that his attorney 
performed in an objectively unreasonable manner. Furthermore, if that claim were 
resolved in his favor, Mr. Wagner would be entitled to relief. Therefore, summary 
dismissal was inappropriate. 
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D. Mr. Wa ner Alie ed Sufficient Evidence To Survive Summa Dismissal In 
Regard To Showing Prejudice Flowing From His Trial Attorney's Deficient 
Performance On Both His Alie ations Of Deficient Performance 
Despite acknowledging that Mr. Wagner asserted, in his own affidavit, that 
'"I would have asked the case be tried to a jury, but Trial Counsel advised me I would 
lose because of my prior record,"' the State maintains that Mr. Wagner did not present 
sufficient evidence speaking to the prejudice prong of the StricklancJ analysis. 5 (Resp. 
Br., p.14 (quoting R., p.74).) As before, this argument is meritless because statements 
of fact in the petitioner's own affidavit alone may constitute sufficient evidence to survive 
summary judgment. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 155. The State cannot justify the decision to 
summarily dismiss the petition simply because it disagrees with the fact alleged by 
Mr. Wagner in his own affidavit, yet that is exactly what it tries to do in this case. 
(See Resp. Br., p. ·14.) If Mr. Wagner's sworn assertion of fact is true, he was prejudiced 
by his trial attorney's deficient performance, and thus, summary dismissal of his claim 
was inappropriate. 
Furthermore, the State's assertion - that Mr. Wagner's sworn statement that he 
would not have pied guilty at that time is insufficient evidence to satisfy the prejudice 
prong - ignores the thrust of Strickland's prejudice analysis. StricklancJ calls for an 
examination of the subjective thought process of the petitioner himself during the plea 
negotiations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Obviously, the petitioner is the only 
person competent to offer evidence as to what thoughts were going through his mind. 
Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Wagner's sworn statement to that effect is not 
5 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984 ), established the two-prong test for 
analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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sufficient to establish, at least, a genuine issue of material fact on the prejudice prong of 
the Strickland analysis is meritless. 
In fact, by arguing that point, the State is arguing for a credibility determination at 
the summary judgment stage of the proceedings. It wants the courts to judge the 
credibility of the allegation in Mr. Wagner's affidavit, find it to be not credible based on 
the purported credibility of other evidence in the record, and thus, summarily dismiss his 
claims. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) That argument runs contrary to a basic tenet of civil 
law6: that "judging credibility is not appropriate during summary judgment proceedings 
where no evidentiary hearing has been held." Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150 
Idaho 664, 674 (20·11 ). As such, the State's argument is wholly improper and should be 
rejected. 
The State also points to the plea colloquy as evidence contradicting 
Mr. Wagner's assertion that he would have demanded a trial. (Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) 
However, that argument ignores one of the other factual assertions Mr. Wagner made in 
his own affidavit: "Trial Counsel did not advise me to lie at my entry of plea, but he told 
me the court would not accept my plea if the questions were not answered 
properly." (R., p.74 (emphasis added).) Therefore, he contended, as a matter of fact, 
that the answers in the plea colloquy were not reliable. That means, despite how much 
the State would like to rely on the answers from the plea colloquy as undisputed facts, 
they are not; Mr. Wagner disputed each and every answer he gave at that time in his 
sworn affidavit. Because those facts were disputed, the district court was not free to 
rely on them in support of its decision to summarily dismiss the petition. See, e.g., 
6 Since post conviction claims are civil in nature, the rules of civil law apply to this case. 
See, e.g., Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
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Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 79·1, 796 (Ct. App. 2012) ("When considering summary 
dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner's favor .... ") 
Besides, even if the State is correct, and the district court could properly weigh those 
answers against Mr. Wagner's allegation during the summary judgment phase, all that 
contradictory evidence does is create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
prejudice. As such, the district court's decision to summarily dismiss the petition is still 
erroneous. 
Therefore, the State's arguments fail to demonstrate, at any level, that the district 
court's decision to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's petition was appropriate. As such, 
this Court should reverse that order, vacate the final judgment and remand this case for 
the evidentiary hearing to which Mr. Wagner is entitled. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wagner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order summarily 
dismissing his petition, vacate the final judgment, and remand this case for an 
evidentiary hearing. 
DATED this 11 th day of December, 2014. 
/1/ 7/4/ 
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BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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